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SUBSIDIARITY OR FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION? A PERSPECTIVE FROM 
LABOR LAW 
 
Alan Bogg* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The principle of subsidiarity has long been central to political deliberation about the 
regulation of work.1 Historically, it reflected “a tangible concern for the economic rights 
of workers as they sell their labor on the market.”2 The activity of work has the potential 
either to uplift or destroy the human spirit. Where work is “decent work,” the worker can 
exercise her imagination, initiative and creativity in the workplace.3 The sphere of work 
also provides an opportunity for workers to learn the norms of reciprocity and solidarity 
through trade union participation, with trade unions functioning as vital mediating 
institutions interposed between the market and the state. Through collective bargaining, 
workers are empowered to create and shape the norms that regulate their working life. 
Where work is degrading, consisting of mindless and monotonous tasks and in 
circumstances of economic deprivation and insecurity, the moral consequences for human 
beings can be catastrophic. The eclipse of independent trade unionism in contexts of 
degrading work leads to further disempowerment, anomie, and a loss of collective self-
mastery over the terms under which employment is conducted. Such work is an affront to 
the dignity of human beings, denying workers the opportunity to forge a life for themselves 
in circumstances of self-respect.4 Subsidiarity contributes to the promotion of decent work 
through its identification of the fundamental point of all coordinated human activity, 
including productive economic activity, which is to enable each human being to participate 
as fully and actively in living their own life: “anyone who is never more than a cog in big 
wheels turned by others is denied participation in an important aspect of human well-
being.”5 
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1 There are multiple accounts of subsidiarity. For an account of the varieties of subsidiarity, see Andreas 
Follesdal, “Survey Article: Subsidiarity,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 190-218. This article will focus 
on the account of subsidiarity described by Follesdal as “catholic personalism” (207). While this account of 
subsidiarity has been central to Catholic social philosophy, I avoid the terminology of “catholic” to avoid 
any suggestion that its tenets cannot be endorsed from a secular perspective. It is nevertheless undeniable 
that its development has been influenced by a series of Papal encyclicals concerned with the requirements 
of social justice. Nor is there a single version of “catholic personalist” subsidiarity. As this article 
demonstrates, there are a variety of instantiations even of this “type” of subsidiarity. 
2 Robert K. Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution,” Indiana Law Review 
35 (2001): 133.  
3 The term “decent work” is attributable to the concept’s use by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) which launched its “Decent Work Agenda” in 1999. See ILO, Decent Work: Report of the Director-
General (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1999). The Decent Work Agenda is examined in Bob 
Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 63-66. 
4 On the nature of work as a form of human good, see A L Bogg, “Only Fools and Horses: Some Sceptical 
Reflections on the Right to Work,” in The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Virginia 
Mantouvalou (Oxford: Hart; 2015), 152-159.  
5 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 147. 
Trade unions occupy a focal position in the constitution of the subsidiarity 
principle. As Vischer has argued, “unions are the most effective structures for mediating 
between individual workers and the largely impersonal and unforgiving marketplace.”6 
Thomas C Kohler has also developed a highly sophisticated set of arguments, basing his 
defense of collective bargaining and autonomous trade unionism on the subsidiarity 
principle.7 Like many other mediating associations in civil society, trade unions have been 
in precipitous decline in the United States and the United Kingdom. The decline of trade 
unionism seems to be part of a wider pattern of decline of social capital in civil society, 
captured under the troubling slogan of “bowling alone.”8 This has given the subsidiarity 
principle a renewed relevance in the urgent quest for an enduring set of solutions to the 
crisis faced by trade unions and the workers that they represent.  
This article will explore the political possibilities offered by the subsidiarity 
principle in the sphere of labor law reform. Like many political principles, the subsidiarity 
principle is compatible with a diverse range of political programs. Different versions of 
the subsidiarity principle display different emphases, which in turn reflect the deeper 
political alignments of the protagonists invoking the principle. In some versions of 
subsidiarity, for example the vision articulated by Pope John Paul II, the principle reflects 
a conservative concern to restrict the coercive power of governmental authority.9 The 
subsidiarity principle thus opposes what it regards as the undue encroachment of state 
socialism on human freedom. Mediating structures in civil society exist as a plural and 
autonomous source of power that operates as a check on government. The free market 
itself is defended insofar as it “recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, 
the market, private property, and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, 
as well as free human creativity in the economic sector.”10 In this political vision of society, 
the subsidiarity principle is a principle of limited government. It thereby emphasizes the 
state’s duties of non-interference in the autonomous networks of civil society. Where social 
functions are capable of being performed through decentralized associations, it is an 
injustice for the state to take over those functions.11 The organizational autonomy of 
associations is a value of particular importance in conservative versions of the principle, 
blocking the absorption of voluntary associations and personal self-assistance by an 
overweening state. 
Other accounts of the subsidiarity principle have emphasized the need for active 
governmental support for civil society in order to promote the self-governing capacities of 
                                                        
6 Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance,” 134. 
7 Thomas C. Kohler, “Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues,” in Seedbeds of Virtue: 
Sources of Competence, Character and Citizenship in American Society, ed. Mary Ann Glendon and David 
Blankenhorn (London: Madison, 1995), 147. 
8 The leading work in this vein is Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). The significance of community in the sphere of work 
has been explored in Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
9 John Paul II, Centesimus annus (1991) para. 48, cited Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance,” 
112. 
10 John Paul II, Centesimus annus, para 42, cited in Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance,” 112-
13. 
11 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 159, where he suggests of subsidiarity that “being a matter of right 
(justice), not merely efficiency, it is obviously closely related to what many people refer to as the right to 
liberty.” 
associations.12 The state has a special responsibility to support the common good of the 
political community. This extends to “the right and the duty to intervene in the economic 
sphere in order to foster justice between capital and labor.”13 This vision of subsidiarity 
places greater emphasis on the perfectionist role of the state in supporting the voluntary 
associations of civil society. Unregulated labor markets can be a source of unfreedom for 
workers. Free markets could also undermine and erode the institutions of civil society, 
such as the family or trade unions. This requires the state to take active steps to “empower” 
mediating institutions such as trade unions, supporting their capacities to operate as self-
governing entities in society: “the government has a responsibility to protect the 
independence and vitality of unions so that they, in turn, may empower society’s 
workers.” 14  Without perfectionist state support for groups such as trade unions, the 
associations of civil society might wither or even disappear.15 The history of labor relations 
is testament to the fact that associative activity cannot simply be taken as a “given” by 
states that care about the moral ecology of a society. A vibrant civil society is a fragile 
achievement that requires nurturing by perfectionist state support.  
Across its history, the subsidiarity principle has inspired both anti-Marxists and 
anti-capitalists. It is not surprising that subsidiarity sometimes appears to have a 
chameleon-like quality as a principle of governance, registering across a wide political 
spectrum. In truth, it is false to present the subsidiarity principle as requiring a choice 
between its role as a source of restraint on state action and its role as a justification for 
perfectionist state action. Most philosophical accounts identify the principle as 
encompassing both constraint and perfectionism.16 Nevertheless, different philosophical 
accounts do tend to place greater emphasis on one or other of its facets.  
This article will engage principally with the work of John Finnis, who has provided 
a rigorous and sophisticated account of the subsidiarity principle in his work on political 
and legal philosophy. It will do so from the perspective of labor law. This disciplinary 
perspective is useful, not least because practical problems of labor have been central to the 
historical development of the subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, the subsidiarity principle 
does not function so as to provide precise blueprints for solving regulatory problems. It is 
as much concerned with the practical craft of governing well and navigating difficulties in 
the real world, as it is with the drawing of precise philosophical lines and distinctions. 
Reflecting back on the philosophical discussions using practical examples from labor law 
may enable us to see the philosophical difficulties in a new light, and to identify weaknesses 
that might otherwise remain hidden. Using this focus, I will argue that there is too much 
constraint and not enough perfectionism in Finnis’s account. In short, Finnis’s version of 
                                                        
12 Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance,” 113-116. 
13 Frederick Crosson, “Catholic Social Teaching and American Society,” in Principles of Catholic Social 
Teaching, ed. David Boileau (Marquette University Press, 1998), 169, cited in Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a 
Principle of Governance,” 114. 
14 Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance,” 138. 
15 For such a “perfectionist” argument in the context of trade unions, see K. D. Ewing, “The State and 
Industrial Relations: ‘Collective laissez-faire’ Revisited,” Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 5 (1998): 1-31. 
This is supported by the work of perfectionist liberals such as Joseph Raz, who argues that many social 
forms providing valuable options for citizens depend upon perfectionist state support: see Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 162. 
16 See the perceptive discussion of this feature of subsidiarity in Paolo G. Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a 
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,” American Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 44. 
the subsidiarity principle represents an excessively conservative version of its implications, 
and this undermines its utility as a political principle for reconfiguring the norms and 
institutions of labor law. The biggest political risk to trade unions in civil society now lies 
in state indifference to their fate, rather than coercive state interference with the autonomy 
of groups. 
In section II, the role of subsidiarity as a “negative” constraint on state action is 
examined. It is reflected in Finnis’s argument that the state should “never” (or only 
“exceptionally”) “take over” the “management,” “direction,” or “formation” of voluntary 
associations in civil society.17 This negative aspect of subsidiarity has been given particular 
emphasis where the subsidiarity principle has been harnessed in conservative political 
projects. I identify some difficulties in its role as a principle of constraint. Many of the 
distinctions at the heart of subsidiarity as constraint lack clarity. While it is important that 
the state respects the organizational autonomy of groups in civil society, these political 
concerns are better addressed through the familiar techniques contained in the right to 
freedom of association. In section III, the role of subsidiarity as a “positive” perfectionist 
principle is examined. Here I argue that Finnis’s account of the subsidiarity principle is too 
restrictive of perfectionist state support, and I suggest some ways in which the principle 
might be reformulated so that it allows greater scope for perfectionist intervention.  
The big question that runs through section IV of this article is the following. In 
response to the precipitous decline of trade unions and collective bargaining, labor lawyers 
are now focusing their attention on freedom of association as a source of restoration for 
labor unions. Across the world, trade unions have secured remarkable advances in 
supporting collective bargaining and the ability to strike through constitutional litigation 
under general freedom of association guarantees. Constitutional litigation is no panacea. 
Supreme court justices cannot wave a magic wand and make workers willing to organize, 
or employers willing to bargain with representative trade unions. Yet there is little doubt 
that rights-based litigation has provided a beacon of hope for workers and trade unions 
looking over the edge and staring into the precipice of a world of work without mediating 
institutions.  
So does this mean that subsidiarity should be dispensed with as a normative 
principle in labor law? In section IV I argue that this would be a big mistake. Subsidiarity 
continues to provide insights of profound significance into the nature and value of 
associational activity. Without the supplementation of subsidiarity, there is a danger that 
freedom of association will be developed in directions that are not in fact conducive to a 
flourishing civil society. The danger is not fanciful. The article examines some recent 
attempts to elucidate the nature of freedom of association in the sphere of labor law, and 
it identifies a number of ways in which missteps in philosophical arguments could have 
been avoided through a greater engagement with the insights of subsidiarity. Consequently, 
labor lawyers would do well to regard subsidiarity as a structuring principle that shapes the 
interpretation and development of freedom of association. Subsidiarity or freedom of 
association? The answer, for labor lawyers at least, must surely be both. 
 
                                                        
17 John Finnis, “Limited Government,” in Finnis, Human Rights and Common Good, Collected Essays: Volume 
III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 89-90. 
 II. Subsidiarity as a Constraint on State Action 
 
According to Finnis, the subsidiarity principle operates as a constraint on the scope of 
legitimate state action. It is thus a principle of limited government. Following a discussion 
of the “common good” in his essay “Limited Government,” Finnis explains the principle 
in the following way: 
 
True too, its [the common good’s] proper range includes the regulation of 
friendships, marriage, families, and religious associations, as well as all the many 
organizations and associations which, like the state itself, have only an instrumental 
(e.g. an economic) common good. But such regulations of these associations 
should never (in the case of the associations with a non-instrumental common 
good) or only exceptionally (in the case of instrumental associations) be intended 
to take over the formation, direction, or management of these personal initiatives 
and interpersonal associations.18 
 
In an important critical engagement with Finnis’s work, Les Green has described this 
principle as the “instrumentality” principle.19 This reflects Finnis’s apparent concern to 
demarcate an absolute protected zone around “non-instrumental” associations, shielding 
them from interference by the “instrumental” association of the state. According to Green, 
the “key idea is that many associations of civil society—things like families, friendships, 
churches, universities, or partnerships—instantiate goods that political life does not. The 
state is an instrument, a means; the associations of civil society involve intrinsically good 
ends. That being so, governments should let them be.”20 
It is certainly true that Finnis articulates the constraint on the state “taking over” 
“non-instrumental” associations as an absolute constraint. However, his account also 
specifies that the “taking over” of “instrumental” associations by the state should only be 
permitted “exceptionally.” While this is a defeasible rather than an absolute constraint, 
“exceptionally” seems to envisage a very strong presumption in favor of the organizational 
autonomy even of “instrumental” associations. In his more recent work, Finnis has also 
suggested that it is unhelpful to describe the political common good as “instrumental” 
because such a term “does not well fit a form of human cooperative associating—political 
governance—which cannot be done well, or even adequately, without both a measure of 
pervasive political friendship and a correct and widely held conception of, and willing favor 
for, the all-inclusive common good of the political community.”21 Hence the state is not simply 
an instrument. Like many of the associations in civil society, the state embodies both 
instrumental and non-instrumental value. Thus, we need to be careful in describing the 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
19 Leslie Green, “The Nature of Limited Government,” in Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John 
Finnis, ed. John Keown and Robert P. George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 194. 
20 Ibid., 193. 
21 John Finnis, “Reflections and Responses,” in Keown and George, Reason, Morality, and Law, 514. This 
modification of his account of common good, as encompassing both intrinsic and instrumental aspects, is 
likewise suggested in the postscript to the second edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, 459. 
constraint in terms of “instrumentality.” States themselves instantiate weighty “non-
instrumental” values; and even “instrumental” associations may only be subject to a 
“taking over” in (undefined) “exceptional” circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the defeasibility of the constraint does vary between “non-
instrumental” associations (“never”) and “instrumental” associations (“exceptionally”) in 
civil society. The distinction and its relevance to subsidiarity is an intriguing one. The first 
difficulty is to understand why the “non-instrumentality” of an association triggers the 
absolute constraint, especially given Finnis’s reflections on the source of the subsidiarity 
principle. In explaining its source, Finnis argues that “human good requires not only that 
one receive and experience benefits or desirable states; it requires that one do certain things, 
that one should act, with integrity and authenticity; if one can obtain the desirable objects 
and experiences through one’s own action, so much the better.”22 It is not at all clear why 
the “non-instrumental” character of an association should lead to elevated protection. 
According to Finnis, the individual’s choosing and realization of commitments, through 
“personal inventiveness and effort in projects,”23 is a vital aspect of human well-being. It 
is only where individuals participate in shaping their own lives through initiative and self-
help, often in collaboration with others, that a human life is led fully. Yet the formulation 
and execution of personal projects and commitments seems as likely to occur in 
“instrumental” associations, such as political groups, neighborhood associations or trade 
unions, as in “non-instrumental” associations such as families or friendships. A more 
relevant consideration would seem to be the scale of the association: state interference with 
larger organizations that are more remote from the individual actions of members might 
be less disruptive of an individual’s self-constituting action than interference with smaller 
organizations. Yet scale and remoteness does not seem to be strongly correlated with the 
instrumental character of an association.  Whatever reason there might be for singling out 
“non-instrumental” associations for absolute protection, the source of the subsidiarity 
principle in enabling self-constituting action in civil society does not seem to be one of 
them.  
Perhaps we need to look elsewhere for an explanation. Another argument might 
be that “intrinsic” value is of more importance than “instrumental” value; hence interfering 
with “non-instrumental” association is more disruptive to human well-being. Les Green 
offers some skeptical reflections on this claim in the following terms: “Assume that the 
communal and cooperative goods of civil society are intrinsically good. It does not follow 
that they are very good. A pretty stone on a beach is intrinsically valuable, but not very 
valuable. On the other hand, even if political cooperation is only of instrumental value, it 
does not follow that it is of little value. On the contrary, it is of enormous value.”24 Green’s 
reflections on the nature of value seem on the mark. The “intrinsic”/“instrumental” 
distinction does not reflect a scale of magnitude or importance. Finnis is of course rather 
more specific in singling out particular forms of “non-instrumental” association in 
demarcating his absolute constraint. He refers to “friendships, marriage, families, and 
religious associations.” So whilst it is true that “intrinsic” value need not be very valuable, 
                                                        
22 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 147. 
23 Ibid., 146. 
24 Green, “The Nature of Limited Government,” 195. 
the specific types of association singled out by Finnis are very valuable indeed. So the 
personal and intimate human relationships that go to constitute family, friendship and 
marriage have generally been regarded at the core of constitutionally protected freedom of 
association in the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on freedom of association.25 
Religious association is likewise treated as a special case of associational liberty, given the 
profound and transcendental significance of religious commitment to the lives of 
adherents. This has also been reflected in the distinctive constitutional treatment for 
religious associations.26 Where the state disrupts the organizational autonomy of such 
associations through “taking over,” the corresponding disruption of the moral and 
personal autonomy of individuals demands anxious scrutiny. This may have less to do with 
the “intrinsic” nature of the association, however, and more to do with the special value 
of intimate and religious associations in personal and moral autonomy.  
A further reason for skepticism is that the distinction is also very difficult to apply 
in the complex and messy terrain of civil society. Many groups seem to display elements 
of both “instrumental” and “intrinsic” value. Thus, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 
the Supreme Court upheld the denial of tax exemption to Bob Jones University on the 
basis that the institution practiced race discrimination in its prohibition of interracial dating 
between students.27 This student policy was based upon a sincere belief in the Biblical 
proscription of miscegenation. In applying the subsidiarity constraint, is Bob Jones 
University best characterized as an “instrumental” or a “non-instrumental” association? 
As a university, it may be regarded as possessing an instrumental character. Universities 
exist to facilitate the pursuit of the good of knowledge, and may be regarded as an 
instrument in furtherance of that end.28 As an institution based upon shared religious 
commitment, it may be regarded as having a “non-instrumental” character. It is surely both. 
On Finnis’s account, the characterization is significant because it determines whether an 
institution like Bob Jones University possesses an absolute or defeasible claim against the 
state “taking over” its “management” or “control.” Yet how to characterize such an 
association deflects attention away from more pressing substantive questions. In her 
perceptive discussion of Bob Jones University v. United States, for example, Gutmann explores 
the different permutations that might arise in this context.29 While the preservation of fair 
educational opportunities might justify state interference in Bob Jones University’s student 
policies, the argument might be less compelling if Bob Jones Church forbade 
miscegenation amongst its congregation. The arguments might shift again if the Church 
                                                        
25 The distinction between intimate and non-intimate associations was a strong feature of the judicial 
reasoning in Roberts, Acting Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights, et al v. United States Jaycees 468 
U.S. 609 (1984), which concerned the freedom of the Jaycees (a large-scale organization for social and 
commercial networking) to discriminate against women in its membership criteria. The Supreme Court 
determined that the Jaycees’s freedom of association was amenable to restriction to ensure non-
discriminatory access for women to the commercial opportunities offered by the association. For critical 
discussion, see George Kateb, “The Value of Association,” in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy Guttman 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 35. 
26 Kent  Greenawalt, “Freedom of Association and Religious Association,” in Gutmann, Freedom of 
Association, 109. 
27 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
28 Green, “The Nature of Limited Government,” 197. 
29 Amy Gutmann, “Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay,” in Gutmann, Freedom of Association, 6-
8. 
was enforcing employment policies against its office staff. The considerations are highly 
sensitive to context. Again, it is not clear how the “instrumental”/“non-instrumental” 
distinction advances the difficult assessment of what is legitimate by way of state 
intervention in the group’s autonomy. 
Perhaps Finnis might respond that we would do better to consider the nature of 
the distinction between “regulation” and “taking overs,” as a more reliable basis for 
assessing the limits of state intervention. Regulation may be permissible; intervention with 
the “aim to take over their formation, direction, or management” is not. Finnis explains 
the distinction in the following way: 
 
Just as, for example, the privileges of the English Parliament exclude any 
management, direction, control, or takeover of either House by the courts or the 
executive, yet do not entail that the criminal law and its officers have no jurisdiction 
over acts and events within Parliament, so state government and law have some 
proper regulatory role in relation to even the internal affairs of families and 
religious associations. The limit excludes any aim to take over their formation, 
direction, or management.30 
 
Does this exclusion of intervention with “any aim to take over their formation, direction, 
or management” provide a coherent limit on the legitimate scope of state interference? It 
may be objected that the formula “take over their formation, direction, or management” 
is too vague.31 For example, British trade unions have long been subject to the state 
imposition of mandatory balloting procedures for the maintenance of political funds, the 
election of specified union representatives, and as a precondition of lawful strike action.32 
Is this a “taking over” of the “management” and “direction” of the trade union? It certainly 
involves extensive state interference with the internal organization and constitution of the 
group. Even if trade union ballots are characterized as “regulation,” what if the state 
imposed statutory ballots to elect archbishops in a church? I suspect that we would be 
much more likely to characterize this as a “taking over” of the “management” of the 
church, simply because the interference is obviously unjust. If we take this step, however, 
we might well wonder at the utility of the concept of a “taking over.” It seems to be 
operating as a placeholder for a set of underlying normative considerations that are not 
being fully articulated. We might do better to address those normative arguments explicitly 
and transparently, rather than mediating them through the rather opaque notion of a 
“taking over” as a conclusory label.  
Moreover, the nature of the moral objection to “taking over” is never made 
explicit. Take an example of an “intrinsic” association such as a church. The officials of 
the church have been involved in corrupt and abusive activities that violate various criminal 
laws. Finnis certainly concedes that the jurisdiction of the criminal law would extend to 
the activities of the officials. For Finnis, state coercion can be justified by the need to 
regulate “interpersonal relations and external acts which impact directly or indirectly on 
                                                        
30 Finnis, “Reflections and Responses”, 514-515. 
31 Finnis acknowledges that the distinction is “vague” albeit “not without content”: ibid, 515. 
32 For a general account of these complex statutory provisions, see A.C.L. Davies, Employment Law 
(Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2015), chs. 11 and 13. 
others.”33  Why should the jurisdiction of the state end here with the enforcement of 
criminal offences against wrongdoers? A state might make provision for associations to be 
placed in a form of temporary administration in these circumstances, until good order is 
restored to the association’s internal governance. This would involve a temporary “taking 
over” of the “management” of the church, until such time as the church is capable of being 
run again by its own members. This form of intervention might salvage the group, rather 
than condemn it to extinction. Where the “taking over” is confined to what is strictly 
necessary to enable the association to become self-governing again, this would seem to be 
consistent with the rationale of the subsidiarity principle. Certainly, it is difficult to see 
what would be objectionable about a “taking over” in these circumstances, yet it would 
seem to be ruled out by Finnis’s version of the principle. 
In a recent symposium on his work, Finnis has now framed the “subsidiarity” 
enquiry in the following way: “If we ask why the largely instrumental character of state 
government limits or tends to limit its jurisdiction over non-instrumental associations and 
the persons who are their members . . . the answer at least in large part will take the form 
of reversing the challenge. It is for the state’s government and law to prove that its 
jurisdiction rightly reaches so far into the lives of those persons and associations whose 
good is more intrinsic than its.”34 What Finnis appears to be conceding here is that the 
constraint generated by the subsidiarity principle is not absolute or “exceptionless.” It is 
instead formulated as a heavy argumentative burden on the state to justify its intervention 
into the lives of persons and associations in civil society. In effect, there is a strong 
presumption against state interference with the associational autonomy. 
In my view, this shift is a very welcome one. It points towards a much more 
particularized evaluation of the “burdens of interference” against the “burdens of non-
interference” in civil society.35 In fact, this style of reasoning is already well established in 
law and political philosophy as a basis for specifying the limits of a group’s claim to 
organizational autonomy, under the guise of the right to freedom of association. It forms 
part of what Green has described as “protected sphere” considerations, such that “certain 
decisions and activities are to be reserved for individuals and groups, especially those that 
involve matters important to their moral independence and autonomy. These are protected 
by familiar individual and collective rights.”36 Freedom of association is an important part 
of this “protected sphere” zone, especially in its protection of the right of groups to 
organizational autonomy. This right will be particularly weighty for groups such as 
religious, expressive or intimate associations, but even here it is—rightly—not absolute. 
For example, De Marneffe gives the example of a church that refuses to permit women to 
be clergy on the basis of uncodified local traditions rather than transcendental beliefs.37 
Such discriminatory practices should not be shielded by the subsidiarity principle or indeed 
                                                        
33 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 459. This principle, based in Finnis’s reading of Aquinas, shares an 
affinity with the “harm principle.” Like the concept of “harm,” the notion of direct or indirect external 
impact requires further moral argument to fill out its content. For further discussion of this moralized 
character of “harm,” see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 414. 
34 John Finnis, “A Response to Harel, Hope, and Schwartz,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 8 (2013): 156. 
35 A persuasive rendering of such a particularized account in these terms is set out and defended in Peter 
de Marneffe, “Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association,” in Gutmann, Freedom of Association, 145. 
36 Green, “The Nature of Limited Government,” 189. 
37 De Marneffe, “Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association,” 156. 
any other principled limit on government action. The associational autonomy of groups 
such as the Jaycees or universities will generally be much weaker in the face of exclusionary 
practices that deprive citizens of economic and social opportunities for full participation 
in civil society. The right to freedom of association already encompasses all of this. It is 
not at all obvious what the subsidiarity principle adds as an additional constraint on state 
action, and the vagueness of its core elements means that it should be dispensed with as 
an independent principle. The necessary work is already being done through the familiar 
“protected sphere” considerations: freedom of association, sometimes supported by 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the right to privacy in the case of expressive, 
religious and intimate associations. Where this ‘protected sphere’ exists, subsidiarity adds 
nothing of use to the normative enquiry. 
 
 
III. Subsidiarity as State Perfectionism 
 
The subsidiarity principle is also a perfectionist principle. In its perfectionist guise, it 
envisages a role for the state in “assisting individuals and groups to coordinate their 
activities for the objectives and commitments they have chosen.” This reflects the 
etymological roots of subsidiarity in the Latin term subsidium, or “help”: 
 
its purpose must be to carry out a function which the Jesuit social theorists of the 
early twentieth century taught us to call subsidiarity (i.e. helping, from the Latin 
subsidium, help): the function of assisting individuals and groups to co-ordinate their 
activities for the objectives and commitments they have chosen, and to do so in 
ways consistent with the other aspects of the common good of the political 
community.38 
 
The perfectionism in subsidiarity is directed at assisting associations and individuals to help 
themselves, in order that individuals can lead lives of self-directed and self-constituting 
action.  As we have seen, subsidiarity is also a principle of constraint. This principle of 
constraint requires that state intervention must never be intended “to take over the 
formation, direction, or management of the lower level personal initiatives and 
interpersonal associations.” Does this principle of constraint restrain state perfectionism 
to an excessive degree? It would certainly seem to rule out perfectionist intervention that 
amounted to a “take over” of the “formation, direction, or management” of an association. 
In an interesting set of reflections on subsidiarity, Daniel Schwartz has described 
subsidiarity as embodying an “anti-state bias,” at least in the form of the principle defended 
by Finnis.39 In support of this restricted perfectionist reading of Finnis, Schwartz offers an 
interesting example of what he regards as an instance of unjust perfectionism: 
 
Suppose that you see your child trying to build a tower with Lego bricks. You see 
that the base is defectively built and know the tower will not reach a great height. 
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You take over and build a very tall and stable tower. Your child however is very 
upset, and rightly so. The whole point of Lego is the activity of building, 
surmounting the challenges, learning along the way, improvising solutions, and 
developing resourcefulness, and self-confidence.40 
 
As it is with Lego, so perhaps it is with living a life. The failures are as integral to a well-
lived life as the successes. The realization of the basic goods in our lives requires our active 
participation and engagement in them: “human good requires not only that one receive 
and experience benefits or desirable states; it requires that one do certain things, that one 
should act, with integrity and authenticity; if one can obtain the desirable objects and 
experiences through one’s own action, so much the better.”41 Where the state intervenes 
and “takes over” a person’s own initiatives and efforts in order to improve outcomes, it 
might be objected that the “beneficiary” of state intervention in fact suffers a serious 
injustice. Such intervention blocks the opportunity for her to participate fully in a basic 
good, it stifles the development of character and imagination that comes from personal 
commitment and active engagement in the world, and overall it stunts her human 
flourishing. According to Schwartz, this would even be true of “take overs” that are 
welcomed or even invited by persons and their associations: “Sometimes welcome offers 
of help hinder people’s capacity to help themselves. The offer of a shortcut that will save 
a person from a strenuous uphill path of self-building, and the many inevitable wrong 
turns, may be irresistible.” 42  The subsidiarity principle should therefore block such 
interventions too, however well-intentioned they might be. In his comments on Schwartz, 
Finnis has signaled his broad approval of Schwartz’s account.43 
In my view, the constraints on perfectionist state action envisaged by Schwartz and 
Finnis are too strict. To support this argument, I propose to use two specific examples of 
perfectionist state intervention from the trade union context, both of which appear to 
involve prohibited “taking overs” whilst having the practical effect of providing powerful 
support to autonomous trade unionism. Before doing so, however, the “Lego” example is 
instructive, for it is not at all obvious that the kind of intervention envisaged in Schwartz’s 
example is necessarily objectionable. It seems true that comprehensive and indiscriminate 
invasions of a person’s own efforts and initiatives, supplanting them through more 
efficient state provision, involves an unjust deprivation of opportunities to self-constitute 
and so flourish as a human being. Yet not all “taking overs” will be of this character. Where 
“taking overs” are narrowly targeted rather than global in their reach, and where this leaves 
citizens with a sufficient range of opportunities for self-constituting action in civil society, 
such interventions may not be objectionable. More particularly, and to stick with 
Schwartz’s Lego example, the well-intentioned parent might teach the child how to build 
an impressive Lego structure by example. Once the child has watched how it is done, he 
may then have the confidence to try for himself. In this way, the “taking over” is a short-
term method of intervention, envisaged as a temporary expedient, and deployed with the 
intention of assisting the child to do his own Lego building in due course. The reasons in 
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favor of this kind of intervention might be particularly compelling where the guidance is 
in fact sought by the child, rather than foisted upon him unwillingly by an over-zealous 
parent. There is something troubling and a little callous where a parent leaves his child to 
flounder, especially after the child has asked for help. This is not at all the same as a stifling 
and unwanted intrusion by an overbearing parent anxious to demonstrate his own 
superiority in building elaborate Lego structures. 
I propose two modifications to the strict constraints envisaged by Schwartz and 
Finnis. First, it may sometimes not be unjust to “take over” lower level personal projects 
and initiatives where that taking over is a temporary and short-term intervention with the 
specific purpose of assisting the association and its members to become self-supporting 
through voluntary action over the longer term. This is still perfectionist intervention 
designed to help associations and their members to help themselves, albeit through a short-
term sacrifice in the self-constituting activities of the association. Secondly, and contra 
Schwartz, there is a significant moral difference between welcome and unwelcome 
perfectionist intervention. Situations of non-voluntary “taking overs” to serve 
perfectionist goals, in the manner of usurpations by the state, are much more likely to be 
unjust than “voluntary” perfectionist “taking overs” that are sought or affirmed by the 
association. That is not to say that it will always be legitimate for the state to provide 
perfectionist support whenever it is sought or welcomed by an association. State support 
might be so global and pervasive that it becomes destructive of the individual initiatives 
and efforts of members of the association. These concerns may be particularly compelling 
where associations become dependent on external support and state provision, for this 
addiction to perfectionist support may be corrosive of the capacities for voluntary action 
that sustain associations in an enduring way. This will not be true of all instances of 
“voluntary” perfectionist interventions, however, and where it is not true, the consent of 
the association and its members to the perfectionist measure should be treated as a reason 
in favor of its legitimacy.  
This may be supported by two specific examples of state intervention in UK labor 
relations. One of the central preoccupations of labor lawyers has been to explore the 
legitimate limits of perfectionist state support for trade union activity and collective 
bargaining. While this examination has often been marked by pragmatism rather than 
conducted as an exercise in political theory, the central quandary for labor lawyers is a 
familiar one to philosophers concerned with subsidiarity: in what circumstances does 
perfectionist state support for trade unions cross the line and become an illegitimate 
incursion into their internal “autonomy” and their freedom to operate as self-governing 
communities? During the middle decades of the twentieth century, the dissolution of 
autonomous groups in civil society (especially trade unions) by totalitarian governments 
meant that the balance between state perfectionism and group autonomy was not simply 
an opportunity for idle philosophical speculation.44 In the UK during this period, labor 
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lawyers were acutely aware of the political sensitivities surrounding excessive perfectionist 
intervention in trade union affairs. Even so, a wide variety of perfectionist measures were 
developed during this period. Whilst some of these involved a sacrifice of autonomy—
indeed a “taking over” by the state of regulatory functions—the measures were efficacious 
in supporting autonomous trade union activity. 
The first perfectionist institutional measure to consider is “Wages Councils.”45 
This envisaged an institutional arrangement whereby wages and other selected terms and 
conditions of employment would be set by a Council consisting of equal numbers of 
employers’ representatives, employee representatives and independent members. The 
Council would issue proposals that could be made enforceable in individual contracts of 
employments through a Ministerial Order. It was not possible for the Minister to modify 
the content of such proposals, in order to protect the autonomy of the Council from state 
interference. Wages Councils were conceived as institutions to provide minimum wage 
standards in industries were union organization was weak or non-existent. These 
institutions were set up by Ministerial Order where the Minister was satisfied that adequate 
collective bargaining machinery did not exist. Indeed, it was possible for this to occur even 
in situations where the Minister of Labor anticipated a failure of existing bargaining 
structures. On the face of it, the operation of Wages Councils seems to involve a “take 
over” of the “formation, management or direction” of a trade union’s collective bargaining 
activities. Where bargaining was non-existent, a Ministerial Order seems to involve a taking 
over of “formation” of collective bargaining; where bargaining was anticipated to fail, a 
Ministerial Order appears to be a taking over of “management or direction” of the trade 
union’s self-governing activities.  
Should we not regard Wages Councils as an instance of unjust perfectionism, rather 
like the overbearing father taking over the building of the Lego structure? Reflecting on 
the specific implementation of Wages Councils legislation, that characterization should be 
resisted. As Wedderburn has observed, Wages Councils provided “a training ground for 
bargaining” by simulating the autonomous processes of collective negotiation. 46  This 
simulation of voluntary collective bargaining shaped the constitutional design of Wages 
Councils, with substantive wage-fixing undertaken by the worker and employer 
representatives themselves rather than imposed by governmental fiat. This was intended 
to provide a stimulus to voluntary collective bargaining once trade union organization 
reached a stage of sufficient strength and maturity. This was encapsulated in the striking 
claim that “the first objective of any Wages Council should be to commit suicide” once 
voluntary collective bargaining was established. 47  The Wages Council performed an 
educative function, providing a substitute for collective bargaining through a statutory 
intervention, but with the objective of stimulating the growth of autonomous processes. 
In this way, the Wages Council is rather like the parent “taking over” the building of the 
Lego structure as a temporary measure, setting an example on how things are to be done 
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so that parental guidance quickly becomes redundant. Where such “taking over” is aimed 
at helping associations to help themselves, designed as a temporary and short-term 
intervention (its primary objective “to commit suicide”), it should be regarded as an 
instance of legitimate perfectionism. 48  Where in practice such institutions operate as 
impediments to voluntary collective bargaining and associational self-help, however, their 
legitimacy would be undermined.49 
Another form of auxiliary intervention is “compulsory arbitration” whereby an 
external agency imposes binding norms on the employer and trade union, usually in the 
event of a failure to negotiate a first collective agreement.50 The political legitimacy of 
“compulsory arbitration” has been a matter of great controversy in labor law, and the 
subsidiarity principle provides an explanation for why that might be so. This is because 
compulsory arbitration seems to constitute a clear case of the state “taking over” the 
“direction” or “management” of the self-governing activities of trade unions and 
employers by imposing norms upon them, usually in the event of “bad faith” bargaining 
leading to a failure to reach agreement. Kahn-Freund once described compulsory 
arbitration as “incompatible with voluntary trade unionism,” and this fortified his view 
that “it has a close affinity to Fascist legal institutions.”51 In other contexts, however, the 
technique of “first contract arbitration” has been proposed as a powerful intervention that 
is effective in promoting sustainable collective bargaining relationships in the face of 
employer hostility.52 This intervention avoids a situation where a trade union is awarded 
collective bargaining rights for the first time but is unable to secure a collective agreement 
in the face of employer intransigence. The imposed norms reflect what would have likely 
been agreed had the employer bargained in good faith with the trade union. As first contract 
arbitration, this is more in the manner of a short-term “taking over” of the “direction” of 
bargaining activities. This tends to promote an enduring autonomous bargaining relationship 
over the longer term. 
In truth, “compulsory arbitration” is a term that encompasses a multitude of 
institutional arrangements, and there are significant normative differences between them. 
Unsurprisingly, these various schemes also encompass a multitude of possible sins and 
virtues displayed in different degrees. A number of points may be made here. First, Kahn-
Freund reserved the deepest opprobrium for compulsory arbitration arrangements that 
prohibited strike action through criminalization. Viewed from the perspective of the 
subsidiarity principle, this opprobrium is warranted. It entailed the transformation of social 
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organizations pursuing their own purposes freely through collective bargaining into 
subordinated instruments of State policy. In Germany, such arrangements contributed to 
the destructive integration of free trade unions into the coercive apparatus of the State.53 
The prohibition of strike action also failed to respect the critical role of the strike in 
facilitating workers’ self-help through voluntary action. Secondly, the status of the arbitral 
body is also important to assessing the legitimacy of compulsory arbitration as a 
perfectionist technique. Where arbitrators are independent of state directives on economic 
and social policy, the dangers of compulsory arbitration leading to the absorption of free 
organizations into the state is reduced. Where ministerial directives bound the arbitrator, 
as had been the case under the Weimar system of compulsory arbitration, the eclipse of 
union autonomy proved to be politically dangerous and was the hallmark of a totalitarian 
state.54  
Thirdly, British labor law has experimented with forms of “unilateral compulsory 
arbitration” as a remedy for failures to bargain or disclose information for collective 
bargaining purposes. The intervention is “unilateral” in the sense that it will have the 
consent of one of the parties (i.e., the trade union) seeking the remedy against the 
employer, but it is “compulsory” in that the imposed norms were binding on the parties.55 
The consent of the trade union is an important factor in assessing the legitimacy of the 
auxiliary measure, and attracts very different considerations to where compulsory 
arbitration overrides the autonomy of trade unions. Finally, Kahn-Freund has argued that 
“compulsory arbitration may have one effect if it is used as an ultima ratio and quite another 
if it supersedes bargaining and is intended to do so.” 56 For example, “first contract” 
arbitration is envisaged as a measure designed to render the need for it otiose because the 
parties subsequently engage with each other willingly. It is limited by reference to the first 
contract between the parties, to give the trade union an opportunity to be self-sustaining 
through autonomous worker action in subsequent iterations of the bargaining process.  
Furthermore, it is an intervention that is sought by the trade union, even if resented as an 
unwarranted intrusion by the employer. 
In assessing the legitimacy of perfectionist intervention, then, the line between 
“state help” and “self-help” is not always clear-cut. Smart regulation may be targeted so as 
to help associations to help themselves more effectively. The history of “auxiliary” 
interventions to support trade unions provides many examples of such interventions. It 
may even sometimes be justifiable for the state to “take over” the functions of associations 
in limited ways where this is done in order to assist those associations to be self-supporting. 
There is no simple metric for determining whether such perfectionist measures are 
legitimate. As the discussion of “compulsory arbitration” demonstrates, this will depend 
upon a variety of factors: the extent to which the measure prohibits the freedom to strike 
of workers and trade unions; whether the arbitrator is independent and insulated from 
state influence; the extent to which one of the parties (usually the trade union) consents to 
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and welcomes the external intervention; and the duration and social effect of the 
intervention. The categorical nature of the prohibition of “taking overs” in the subsidiarity 
principle glosses over these relevant normative distinctions. It matters how a “taking over” 
is implemented in assessing whether it is a legitimate perfectionist intervention.  
Other accounts of the subsidiarity principle are more forgiving of perfectionist 
intervention. For example, Crosson has argued that it is the state’s responsibility “to assist 
the subsidiary groups in achieving their proper ends, and to implement those ends itself 
only temporarily in circumstances where the subsidiary group is, perhaps because of 
particular socio-economic conditions, incapable of functioning normally. This . . . involves 
the state intervening—but temporarily and in limited fashion—to secure the goods of the 
partial community. . . . Hence the state’s intervention should aim at helping the subsidiary 
group regain the capacity to function for itself.”57 This framing of the subsidiarity principle 
would open up much more political space for the state to deploy a wide variety of 
perfectionist “auxiliary” interventions to support trade unions and restore collective 
bargaining, even if this extends to a “take over” of certain functions by the state. If 
subsidiarity is to remain relevant in an era of trade union decline, the perfectionist aspects 
of subsidiarity needs to be given much greater emphasis, and this requires a loosening of 
the constraints on state perfectionism to permit ‘taking overs’ in certain circumstances. 
 
 
IV. Subsidiarity as a Structuring Principle of Freedom of Association 
 
Freedom of association now occupies center-stage as a legal strategy for reversing trade 
union decline. Litigation strategies in constitutional courts have been successful in utilizing 
freedom of association as a basis for developing rights to organize in trade unions, to 
engage in collective bargaining, and to strike. This turn towards litigation no doubt reflects 
a political judgement that workers and trade unions have become increasingly marginalized 
in the general democratic process.  
While freedom from state interference in internal organization remains a significant 
freedom for trade unions, greater urgency has attached to securing the freedom to engage in 
core activities such as collective bargaining.  Scholarly interest in freedom of association 
has been reinvigorated in many jurisdictions following a spectacular reversal of organized 
labor’s fortunes in constitutional litigation. Constitutional jurisprudence in the Supreme 
Court of Canada has undergone a transformation following the constitutional recognition 
of the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike as elements in the Canadian 
Charter’s general protection of freedom of association.58 The European Court of Human 
Rights has also been in the vanguard of a bold development of trade union freedoms, 
especially under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.59 Writing just 
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over 25 years ago, Lord Wedderburn offered a pessimistic assessment of freedom of 
association as a constitutional basis for developing trade union rights. 60  Judicial 
construction of freedom of association tended to configure it narrowly as a right for 
individuals to form and join associations. Wedderburn regarded this as a rather obtuse 
understanding of the freedom at stake in freedom of association in the field of labor law. 
Trade unions were ultimately purposive entities that existed to pursue vital protective goals 
on behalf of their members. That purposive understanding was largely absent from judicial 
deliberations on freedom of association. Over the last decade, freedom of association has 
been transformed in many of the jurisdictions that had attracted Wedderburn’s earlier 
withering assessment. This jurisprudence has recognized trade unions as actors with their 
own independent constitutional rights, alongside the constitutional rights of workers 
themselves.61 
One effect of this rise in freedom of association’s general prestige amongst labor 
lawyers has been the eclipse of subsidiarity as a normative inspiration for labor law reform. 
Does this mean that the subsidiarity principle should be treated as having been superseded 
by the right to freedom of association as a reference point for labor lawyers? In my view, 
to turn away from the subsidiarity principle now would be a big mistake. Freedom of 
association is concerned with the protection of groups and collective activities. It must 
therefore be informed by a rational account of the nature of groups and group action, the 
value of groups, and the relationship between the group’s agency and the agency of its 
individual members. Subsidiarity provides a deep and compelling engagement with those 
issues. It thus provides a valuable corrective to some of the missteps that can occur when 
regulatory choices about freedom of association are based upon faulty understandings of 
group phenomena. In this way, subsidiarity should be regarded as a structuring principle 
for freedom of association: complementary to it, and anything but redundant. 
In support of this complementarity, the remainder of this article will explore some 
influential philosophical work on freedom of association in labor law. This work has 
provided an important theoretical framework for the naissance of freedom of association 
as a labor right. Let us start, then, with one of Sheldon Leader’s core claims about the 
nature of freedom of association, taken from the leading work Freedom of Association: A 
Study in Labor Law and Political Theory: 
 
 
A static conception understands it as a right to join groups per se. A dynamic 
conception sees it as a right to try to achieve something by way of association, 
where the goal to be achieved lies outside of the group and is not reached simply 
by the act of joining it. The first conception of the right sees it as protecting 
interests which can be satisfied by the fact that people come together, as is often 
true in families, religious meetings, and clubs. The second conception sees 
association as a method of coordinating interests for their more effective 
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advancement against the outside world. It follows that the first conception is 
satisfied once we allow people to form and to join associations per se. The second 
conception demands satisfaction in a more complex way: it calls not simply for the 
permission to form and to join groups, but also the opportunity under conditions 
that are not unfairly debilitating to act through them.62 
 
 
This distinction between “static” and “dynamic” seems to neatly capture the shifts that 
have occurred in changing judicial constructions of freedom of association. The older 
approach, which emphasized the individual’s basic right to be a trade union member, 
reflected this “static” conception. The newer approach, based on an expanding frontier of 
collective freedoms such as a right to strike, reflects the “dynamic” conception. For Leader, 
this “dynamic” approach is preferable. Freedom of association is concerned with 
protecting individuals so that they can do things together with others. If individuals are 
free to bargain individually, they should be free to bargain collectively. If individuals are 
free to withdraw their labor individual, they should be free to do so collectively. And so 
forth. It is the individual’s freedom to do things with others that is the distinctive concern 
of freedom of association, ensuring symmetry between individual actions and their 
collective exercise.63 
On its face, this core claim provides a compelling and liberating vision of freedom 
of association. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that it is problematic for four reasons. 
Those reasons become clearer once we reflect back on the general account of groups and 
their contribution to human flourishing that underlies the subsidiarity principle.  
 
A. The Dynamic Nature of Groups 
 
We have already noted that Leader develops an argument in favor of the “dynamic” 
conception of freedom of association. Insofar as this encompasses protection for core 
trade union activities, that is the correct end-point. The misstep is in the starting 
assumption that there is any meaningful distinction to be drawn at all between “static” and 
“dynamic” association. That is a mistake. It is natural enough, perhaps, for a lawyer to take 
this distinction as a starting point, for it is so deeply embedded in the judicial mind-set, 
especially in many of the older cases on freedom of association. Yet there is no such thing 
as a “static” association, as Finnis’s theoretical account of the nature of group existence 
makes clear. The reasoning in the older cases simply betrays faulty philosophical thinking 
about groups. 
Leader describes the “static” conception as being especially relevant to families and 
religious associations, where it is simply the coming together as members of the group that 
satisfies their relevant interests. So some types of group, such as those based on religiosity 
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or intimacy or sociability, are “static.” Other groups, for example trade unions, are 
“dynamic” in being directed at the pursuit of external goals. This seems to involve some 
slippage back into the difficulties explored earlier, and the rather elusive distinction 
between “instrumental” and ‘non-instrumental’ associations. But leaving that worry to one 
side, there is a more fundamental objection to this analysis.  
In his reflections on the nature of community, Finnis has argued that the existence 
conditions of any human group require “over an appreciable span of time, a co-ordination 
of activity by a number of persons, in the form of interactions, and with a view to a shared 
objective.”64 This reflects sensitivity to the underlying value of subsidiarity, of persons doing 
things, using their own imagination and initiative to participate in forms of life that will 
often be based on cooperation and coordination with others. This coordination of activities 
around shared purposes is indisputably a feature of even the most intrinsic of associations. 
In friendships, the coordination is undertaken for the sake of the friend’s well-being. This 
coordination will often consist in complex activities such as shared recreational and leisure 
pursuits, and mutual support and help in times of need. Like marriage, this intrinsic form 
of association is very far from being static. In more instrumental arrangements, such as a 
business venture, the coordination may be undertaken for the sake pursuing external goals 
where the members may be indifferent to each other’s individual objectives. Here again, 
though, the coordination of individual action is a central feature of the association’s 
existence. Without coordinated actions, the association is unlikely to prosper as an 
instrument to the realization of the members’ shared goals. 
While the nature of the common good of the association is quite different in each 
case, the need for shared purposes and coordinated activities is a fundamental requirement 
of any association’s existence. To the extent that the “static” conception of freedom of 
association isolates the fact of membership as sufficient for some associations, it rests upon 
a basic mistake about the nature of groups. Obviously, the purposes and the character of 
the members’ coordinated actions will vary depending upon the nature of the goods that 
are being pursued: families, neighborhood associations, social clubs, religious 
denominations, trade unions and universities all differ greatly in this respect. Nevertheless, 
the existence of all groups is constituted by coordinated actions directed at shared 
purposes. Since all groups must be understood as being constituted by coordinated actions 
in pursuit of purposes shared by members of the group, all groups must be understood as 
“dynamic.” The category of ‘static’ association is empty. To give it any credence at all risks 
conferring unwarranted legitimacy on some of the older cases on freedom of association 
that are based upon this “static” conception. 
 
B. Freedom of association and legal intervention 
 
The preceding point about “static” association is something more than a conceptual 
quibble. It has important political implications, for the “static” account is also aligned with 
a minimalist conception of the role of the law in supporting associations. Leader’s account 
of “static” association implies that the non-intervention of the state will suffice to respect 
the right. Once we allow people to form and to join associations per se, “static” freedom of 
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association is respected, whereas respect for “dynamic” associations “demands satisfaction 
in a more complex way.”65  
Would a simple permission from the state ensure respect for the basic right to be 
a member of an association? That seems unlikely. The state may be under a duty to protect 
citizens from interference by employers who might seek to coerce or interfere with the 
choice to join a trade union. This might necessitate the implementation of a complex set 
of rights protecting individuals from refusals of employment, bribes and financial 
inducements, detriment, and dismissal on the ground of trade union membership. These 
individual rights may need to be supported by a regulatory regime to tackle blacklisting 
practices, and the misuse of information by organized groups of employers where 
information is shared and used to deny employment opportunities to trade unionists. It 
will also be necessary to provide the trade union itself with certain basic rights so that it is 
capable of functioning as a coordinating entity: without a group that exists, there would be 
nothing for the individual to join.66 This requires a mechanism for enabling the trade union 
to acquire some form of legal personality, so that it can hold property, enter into contracts 
on its own account, and engage in legal proceedings. The ability to enter into contractual 
arrangements with members may be particularly important in the trade union context, 
because the contract of membership typically encompasses disciplinary rules and 
procedures. This supports the union’s internal authority so that it is better able to 
coordinate its members, and to maintain social norms of solidarity in the face of external 
threats and the usual temptations of defection and free-riding. The legal system may also 
need to regulate the interactions between groups where there are competing claims of 
membership solidarity. For example, in Sindactul ‘Pastorul Cel Bun’ v. Romania the ECtHR 
subordinated the right of priests to form their own trade union to the religious authority 
of the Orthodox Church.67 The Church had successfully challenged the registration of the 
dissident trade union in the domestic courts. The “autonomy” of the Orthodox Church to 
maintain its preferred form of life through religious authority was given strong protection 
under Article 9 of the ECHR which protected freedom of religion. The seemingly simple 
right to be a trade union member required complex legal machinery to mediate the claims 
of conflicting group loyalties. 
All of this envisages a highly complex structure of legal regulation as a basis for the 
fundamental right to trade union membership. This recognition is important for two 
reasons. First, it reinforces the perfectionist reading of the subsidiarity principle. The 
“laissez-faire” view that civil society will just “take care of itself” without extensive legal 
support is untenable. The complex nature of groups as based on coordinated activities 
around shared purposes necessitates a complex legal structure of individual and collective 
rights. This seems to be true even for the implementation of the most basic right to join a 
group.  A vibrant and diverse civil society requires strong perfectionist state support 
through coordinating legal norms for its maintenance.  
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Secondly, Leader has given us no reason to accept that “dynamic” freedom of 
association requires more complex and demanding legal intervention than ‘static’ freedom 
of association. It is not clear why legal protection of a “right to strike” would be any more 
or less complex or demanding than legal protection of a “right to form and join a trade 
union.” This is politically significant, for at least some of the reservations that have been 
articulated about the judicial development of “dynamic’ rights, such as the right to 
collective bargaining, seem based on the assumption that such rights (in Leader’s words) 
‘demand satisfaction in a more complex way.” Where rights demand “more complex” 
satisfaction, this might generate institutional concerns about the appropriate limits of the 
judicial role in a constitutional democracy.68 Or, where this complexity is manifested in a 
larger set of correlative duties, we might be concerned with the knock-on effects of 
complex rights on the personal freedom of duty-bearers.69 Given the complex nature of 
the right to form and join trade unions, the recognition of “dynamic” rights such as the 
right to strike seems to cross no Rubicon in this respect. ‘Dynamic’ freedom of association 
gives us no extra cause for concern. Subsidiarity, and its theory of group action, helps to 
explain why the coyness about ‘dynamic’ rights over “static” rights is misplaced. 
 
C. The nature of group action 
 
A third area of controversy has been whether freedom of association extends to trade 
unions as right-holders engaged in their own protected ‘inherently collective’ activities.70 
This particular ship has already sailed in the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of Canada: 
the rights of trade unions are treated as independently grounded, rather than trade unions 
piggy-backing derivatively on the constitutional protection of individual rights.71  Building 
upon Leader’s philosophical arguments, Brian Langille has argued that such a move is 
mistaken: 
 
If I have a right to bargain collectively, the fact that collective bargaining is “an 
inherently collective activity” does not and cannot enter into the matter. Once I 
have exercised my right to freedom of association, I have indeed ended up in the 
very circumstance that the right is designed to secure: participation in a group or 
collective, which by definition I cannot do alone. This individual conception of the 
right can, and does, perform all of the work required. Indeed, without a mooring 
in concern for real people, it is hard to see why groups are important.72 
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Langille’s final normative point is surely right: the ultimate point of all associations is to 
assist individuals to lead lives of value.73 Langille argues that the fundamental moral priority 
of persons leads to two basic consequences for freedom of association. First, that 
“inherently collective activity” “does not and cannot enter into the matter” of what is 
protected by freedom of association. All of the matters with which we might be concerned 
will consist of a series of individual acts that are undertaken collectively. To the extent that 
the category “inherently collective activity” implies that some group acts are not 
straightforwardly divisible into their component individual acts, this is an unhelpful 
mystification. Secondly, Langille thinks that the individual right “can, and does, perform 
all of the work required.” Why might this be so? Perhaps Langille thinks that group rights 
obscure the point that only persons have ultimate moral value. Or perhaps Langille thinks 
that group rights are somehow less “fundamental” than individual rights or might 
otherwise threaten individual interests.74 Whatever the reasons, Langille does not believe 
that there are fundamental group rights warranting special constitutional protection. 
The underlying theory of group action in Finnis’s account of subsidiarity 
demonstrates the falsity of this picture, and indicates another crucial way in which 
subsidiarity operates as a corrective to faulty thinking about freedom of association. On 
Finnis’s account, we may readily accept (i) that only persons have ultimate moral value; but 
that (ii) it is perfectly intelligible to treat some group actions as “inherently collective.” As 
such, the subsidiarity principle provides powerful support for the notion of “inherently 
collective activities” in the constitutional jurisprudence of the SCC. While there is more 
argumentative work to be done in establishing the existence of group rights, the insights of 
the subsidiarity principle at least block out some of the main arguments levelled against 
group rights by Langille. At the very least, it demonstrates how the protection of ‘inherently 
collective’ activities under freedom of association is a reasonable constitutional choice. 
Let us begin with the fundamental value of subsidiarity. According to Finnis, it is 
“to help the participants in the association to help themselves.”75 This requires that persons 
“do certain things, that one should act, with integrity and authenticity.”76 In this way, 
individuals are enabled to participate in the basic goods and to constitute themselves 
through deliberation, choice and activity, rather than being the passive consumers of end-
states and experiences provided by remote external agencies. Wherever possible, we should 
make our own way in the world, forging our own lives in cooperation with others. That is 
what it means to lead a life. This has led Finnis to be skeptical about theories of corporate 
personality that postulate the group as a real entity with a real personality.77 This skepticism 
is well-justified. The attribution of personality to groups “is a distracting metaphor in a 
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realistic moral and political analysis of human associations and their actions.”78 This is 
because groups do not possess a substance and rational nature beyond “the many orderings 
of human association which we call groups—nothing except the people who are 
members.”79 So far, there is nothing here that is inconsistent with Langille’s account of the 
morality of association. This is just as well, for the moral priority of persons seems to be 
just the right starting-point. 
Does it follow from this that collective acts must always be reducible to the 
component acts of individuals? Langille certainly seems to think so. However, some recent 
philosophical work on the nature of group rights and group action has debunked this 
reducibility thesis very convincingly. For example, Dwight Newman has drawn an 
important distinction between the supervenience of collectivities on the acts of individual 
members and reducibility of the collectivity to the individual acts that constitute the 
group.80 Newman gives the example of individual voting on a university committee leading 
to a decision to close down a department. The electoral outcome is of course determined 
by a series of individual voting choices. The decision itself may nevertheless attract moral 
comment in its own right: “There is an ineliminable reference to the collectivity in our 
moral commentary, and that is sufficient to make a prima facie case that the collectivity’s 
actions can be morally analysed independently of the individual acts on which they 
supervene in some respects.”81 Finnis’s account of subsidiarity supports this distinction 
between supervenience and reducibility. It is certainly the case that group acts cannot be 
divorced from the coordinated individual activities of the group’s members; that would of 
course be nonsensical. The misstep in Langille’s theory of freedom of association is to 
treat this as closing off the possibility that the group itself may nevertheless be acting. Finnis 
explains this notion of group action through the group’s adoption and implementation of 
a plan or “proposal” on what is to be done: “the unity of action coordinated according to 
this adopted proposal is the unity of a group act distinguishable (albeit inseparable) from 
the activities of individuals...pursuant to a single, public proposal.”82 
Langille does not deny that there are certain things that cannot but be done 
collectively: the performance of a choir; or collective bargaining; or participation in a 
language community. He does deny that these group acts can be understood as “inherently 
collective,” that is as group acts that are not reducible to their component individual acts: 
collective bargaining is individual bargaining undertaken by a collectivity of individual 
workers; the performance of a choir is individual singing undertaken by a collectivity of 
singers; a strike is an aggregation of individual withdrawals of labor undertaken by a group 
of workers, and so forth. It is of course true that the group act cannot be detached from 
the acts of individual participants. If there are no individual workers acting in coordination 
in the pursuit of an adopted plan to secure better terms of employment, there will be no 
collective bargaining. In other words, and to use the helpful distinction drawn by Newman, 
group acts are supervenient on the acts of individual members of the group. Pace Langille, 
however, it is quite possible to conceive of group acts that are not reducible to individual 
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acts. That is, there is supervenience without reducibility. Take the example of a team 
performance at sport. One can marvel at the fluency of the team’s coordinated 
performance, manifesting a well-executed strategy that results in a victory. The 
performance of the whole team may be much more admirable than the sum of its 
individual players’ performances. The action of the team itself, as distinct from its 
individual players, is an appropriate object of independent evaluation; even though the 
team’s performance can never be independent of the coordinated actions of individual 
players. In this sense, then, there are “inherently collective” actions that are not 
straightforwardly divisible into individual component contributions. 
Finnis’s theory of group action enables us to make sense of the character of the 
“right to strike” in countries like Germany, where the trade union itself is regarded as the 
relevant right-holder. In Finnis’s terms, a strike as an “inherently collective” act may be 
understood as the adoption and implementation of a public proposal by the individual 
workers acting through the internal decision-making structures of the trade union. This 
“unity of action coordinated according to this adopted proposal is the unity of a group act 
distinguishable (albeit inseparable) from the activities of individuals.”83 Comparative labor 
lawyers would of course point to the varieties of strike laws in different legal regimes. Some 
legal systems specify the right to strike as an individual right, albeit one exercised 
collectively with others, and this is often a reflection of the legal culture, and the political 
and ideological character of the trade union movement.84 But none of this commits us to 
the view that the right to strike must be understood as a group right, even if Langille’s 
account implies that it must be understood as an individual right. This would be a matter 
residing within the creative scope of determinatio, requiring a choice by the law-giver 
amongst different reasonable options.85 The value of Finnis’s account is that it shows us 
how the configuration of striking or collective bargaining as an “inherently collective” 
activity is reasonable as a constitutional choice. There is nothing at all odd about a group act 
that is not straightforwardly reducible to a set of component individual acts. We can talk 
sensibly about the trade union’s strike, whether it was a responsible exercise of a 
constitutional freedom, the trade union’s right to strike, and so forth, quite independently 
of any moral appraisal of individual strikers. We can also appraise the acts of individual 
strikers independently of the trade union, especially where they act beyond the scope of 
the formulated plan.       
Finnis’s sophisticated account of group action is fully in alignment with Langille’s 
view that “the primal aspiration of our labour law is to protect and to advance the interests 
of workers” as human persons.86 It commits us to no silly baggage about groups having a 
real personality or the priority of groups over persons in respect of ultimate value. While 
it is of course true that the notion of “inherently collective” acts does not establish the 
existence of group rights, it at least raises a significant doubt in Langille’s claim that the 
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“individual conception of the right can, and does, perform all of the work required.” That 
does not seem to be true where “inherently collective” acts are concerned. The category 
of “inherently collective” acts is, moreover, a reasonable way of explaining group 
phenomena in many contexts of workplace collective action. 
 
D. The special value of the strike as a form of self-constituting action 
 
Why would we protect the right to strike as a fundamental right under freedom of 
association? Leader provides a clear and emphatic answer to this question. 
 
 
Should the right to strike be understood, not as a means of respecting, but rather 
as a species of the right to freedom of association? There is a strong, basic reason 
for thinking that it should be: if we look closely at the structure of the two rights, 
we can see that they are aimed to prevent the same sort of injustice. This is the 
inequity involved in subjecting individuals to a blanket prohibition, an automatic 
disability, preventing them from acting together when they are each allowed to 
pursue the same objective when acting alone, and hence making them less free to 
do collectively what they are allowed to do individually.87 
 
On this view, there is nothing special about the right to strike as a “species of freedom of 
association.” We could multiply the “species of freedom of association” indefinitely: a right 
to play tiddly winks together; a right to read books together; a right to count blades of 
grass together; a right to protest together. The freedom at stake in freedom of association 
is the freedom to do something with others. For some scholars, this has evident attractions. 
It ensures “neutrality” in the constitution of fundamental rights.88 Courts and constitution-
makers should not take a stand on which exercises of freedom of association are valuable, 
or inconsequential, or worthless. That is for citizens to decide for themselves. An 
alternative approach to freedom of association rejects this neutrality. Certain exercises of 
freedom are given a focal normative position in freedom of association. Trade unions are 
often identified explicitly in freedom of association guarantees, whereas many other types 
of association are not. Increasingly, certain types of trade union right are given an elevated 
status in freedom of association, such as the right to bargain collectively and the right to 
strike. Is it possible to make coherent sense of this structure of priorities in freedom of 
association, or does it simply reflect the accidents of litigation strategies and political 
pressures brought to bear in constitutional drafting? 
The subsidiarity principle provides an explanation for why the right to strike is 
regarded as an associational freedom of profound significance, whereas playing tiddly 
winks or counting blades of grass together is not. Collective bargaining and strike action 
constitute a distinctive form of human activity where workers “help themselves by their 
own private efforts and initiatives.”89 This is why collective bargaining and the right to 
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strike are rightly identified as trade union freedoms of special value in freedom of 
association, for it is through voluntary self-organization that workers are able to help 
themselves through their own endeavors. Historically, labor lawyers were intensely 
preoccupied with the question of how substantive labor standards were formulated and 
implemented. This was a matter of political and moral significance rather than an issue of 
merely technical interest. It marked a preference for workers forging their own norms 
rather than being passive recipients of state support or employer paternalism. It was a way 
of achieving dignity and self-respect in the midst of the degradation and depredations of 
industrial capitalism. This is why the denial of collective bargaining and the right to strike 
are regarded as a serious injustice, for this denial disrupts the dignified efforts of workers 
to shape their own working lives, and in so doing to shape personal identity through self-
constituting action. 
Recent jurisprudential developments in the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) have 
reflected this sophisticated understanding of the freedom at stake in freedom of 
association. In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) the Court was 
called upon to consider whether the imposition of a “Staff Relations Representative 
Programme,” and a refusal to engage in collective bargaining with independent trade 
unions representing the police, was a violation of the right to freedom of association under 
section 2 (d) of the Canadian Charter.90 A majority of the Court concluded that this 
imposition of a mandated representative body constituted a “substantial interference” with 
freedom of association. In support of this holding, the Court articulated a sophisticated 
account of the special value of the freedom protected in ‘freedom of association’, drawing 
upon the earlier influential dissent of Chief Justice Dickson in the Alberta Reference: 
 
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is, I believe, 
to recognize the profoundly social nature of human endeavours and to protect the 
individual from state-enforced isolation in the pursuit of his or her ends…As social 
beings, our freedom to act with others is a primary condition of community life, 
human progress and civilized society. Through association, individuals have been 
able to participate in determining and controlling the immediate circumstances of 
their lives, and the rules, mores and principles which govern the communities in 
which they live…Freedom of association is most essential in those circumstances 
where the individual is liable to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and 
more powerful entity, like the government or an employer. Association has always 
been the means through which political, cultural and racial minorities, religious 
groups and workers have sought to attain their purposes and fulfil their aspirations; 
it has enabled those who would otherwise be vulnerable and ineffective to meet 
on more equal terms the power and strength of those with whom their interests 
interact and, perhaps, conflict.’91 
 
In Mounted Police Association the SCC based its reasoning on what it described as a 
“purposive” conception of freedom of association. This “purposive” conception is 
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strongly aligned with the understanding of associational activity in the Finnisian theory of 
subsidiarity. Thus, in the words of the Court, “the guarantee of freedom of association 
empowers vulnerable groups and helps them work to right imbalances in society.  It 
protects marginalized groups and makes possible a more equal society.”92 In other words, 
the fundamental point of freedom of association is to empower groups, and in so doing 
to enable individuals to help themselves and each other through concerted action. It is in 
this sense, then, that freedom of association is properly described as “purposive,” in the 
light of its special contribution to facilitating self-constituting action through participation 
in groups in civil society. The normative value of voluntary collective bargaining through 
freely formed associations of workers is the embodiment of self-help through cooperative 
action.  
According to the SCC, the imposition of a representative scheme on workers 
undermined the elements of choice and independence upon which the value of freedom of 
association is based. The workers’ freedom to choose a representative facilitates 
accountability and empowers workers to shape the collective goals pursued by their 
association: it ensures that “their voice will be conveyed to the employer by the people they 
choose.”93 The legal regime would accordingly need to protect “the ability to form and join 
new associations, to change representatives, to set and change collective workplace goals, 
and to dissolve existing associations.”94 Independence complements choice by ensuring that 
the association and its collective goals are autonomously directed by the workers 
themselves, rather than directed, manipulated or imposed by management or the state. 
This would necessitate “the freedom to amend the association’s constitution and rules, the 
freedom to elect the association’s representatives, control over financial administration and 
control over the activities the association chooses to pursue.”95 Choice and independence 
ensure that the workers themselves are in charge of the “formation, direction or 
management” of their association, rather than this being usurped by the state.  
The functional value of freedom of association in assisting workers to help 
themselves through collective action was also pivotal in the SCC’s recent decision in 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan.96 The provincial government introduced 
legislation that prohibited strike action in certain “essential” public services, nor was any 
substitute mechanism provided for those employees in a situation of bargaining impasse. 
The SCC held that this legislation violated freedom of association under the Charter 
because it constituted an unjustifiable interference with the right to strike. The right to 
strike was identified as an “indispensable component” of the right to a meaningful 
collective bargaining process.97 The basis for the SCC’s conclusion that the right to strike 
was a protected through freedom of association reveals a common normative foundation 
shared with the majority judgment in Mounted Police Association. After citing Chief Justice 
Dickson’s defense of ‘purposive’ freedom of association and its underlying values in the 
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Alberta Reference, 98 Justice Abella justified the constitutional recognition of the right to 
strike in the following way: 
 
The right to strike is essential to realizing these values and objectives through a 
collective bargaining process because it permits workers to withdraw their labour 
in concert when collective bargaining reaches an impasse.  Through a strike, 
workers come together to participate directly in the process of determining their 
wages, working conditions and the rules that will govern their working lives…The 
ability to strike thereby allows workers, through collective action, to refuse to work 
under imposed terms and conditions. This collective action at the moment of 
impasse is an affirmation of the dignity and autonomy of employees in their 
working lives.99 
 
Note the final sentence: exercising the right to strike at a bargaining impasse is “an 
affirmation of the dignity and autonomy of employees in their working lives.” The ability 
to strike enables workers to lead an existence worthy of human dignity and autonomy by 
granting them a measure of collective control over the norms that regulate their working 
life. Workers cease to become passively dependent on state support or employer good will 
and engage with the vital task of shaping their own collective fate. As the most potent 
form of worker “self-help” through collective action, the right to strike empowers workers 
to contest injustice from a position of greater equality. Given the contribution of strike 
action in helping workers to help themselves through trade union association, the SCC 
identifies the right to strike as a freedom of special significance under freedom of 
association. This is because of its vital contribution to the life of self-constituting action, 
that one should “do certain things, that one should act, with integrity and authenticity; if 
one can obtain the desirable objects and experiences through one’s own action, so much 
the better.”100 Denial of the right to strike thus constitutes a violation of freedom of 
association that is of momentous significance. This is informed by an understanding of 
why human freedom is valuable and therefore why it is appropriate to identify some 
instances of freedom as more valuable and worthy of respect than others. In this sense, 
Dickson’s conception of freedom of association is rightly described as “purposive,” in its 
attentiveness to the proper ends of human activity in interpersonal associations. 
Subsidiarity provides a compelling and rich rationalization of what it is that is ‘purposive’ 
about freedom of association. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The contribution of John Finnis to the modern revival of natural law theory has been 
immense. His account of the subsidiarity principle stands as one of the most rigorous 
contemporary philosophical accounts of its nature and value. The article has suggested 
some modifications to Finnis’s account of the subsidiarity principle, and it has argued for 
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a shift in emphasis to bring forth the perfectionist elements of subsidiarity more strongly. 
This reformulation nevertheless remains sympathetic to some broader themes in Finnis’s 
moral and political philosophy. First, it rejects the alignment of some modern theories of 
freedom of association with an ideal of “neutrality.” Such accounts advocate the need to 
avoid discriminating value judgements as to which particular exercises of freedom of 
association should be given special protection. In his discussion of freedom of speech, 
Finnis has argued that it “does not properly include exposure of the whole population, or 
even the whole adult population, to pornography, salacious advertising, and the filmed or 
cartooned glorification of cultural nihilism by cynically inhuman violence.” 101  The 
conception of freedom of association defended here, informed by the insights of the 
subsidiarity principle, similarly rejects “neutrality.” Some forms of association and 
concerted activities are simply more worthwhile than others in their contribution to 
helping citizens to lead a valuable life. We should be unashamed in marking out those 
distinctions in our law and practice. A trade union committed to the principles of worker 
self-help is more worthy of our respect than an association of employers that compiles and 
circulates “blacklists” of trade unionists. Concerted blacklisting by employers is an attack 
on freedom of association: it is a harmful activity with no redeeming social value and does 
not warrant any protection under freedom of association. The practices of solidarity and 
self-help amongst workers committed to justice in the workplace are an especially valuable 
form of associative activity. “Neutrality” as even-handedness between the worthwhile and 
the worthless has no place in the configuration of fundamental human rights. 
Secondly, nothing in this article should be read as a plea for the 
“constitutionalization” of labor rights, entrusting them to the processes of adjudication in 
constitutional courts. The normative enquiry into the constituent elements of freedom of 
association is quite distinct from the institutional enquiry into its appropriate political 
realization, and the respective roles of courts and legislatures in that task. It is a mistake to 
conflate these two enquiries. To describe freedom of association as a “statutory” rather 
than a “constitutional” right should not be read as any reflection of the normative 
importance attached to this right in a political culture. There may be sound reasons of 
institutional morality why we should entrust the specification of a fundamental right to 
ordinary legislation, amenable to democratic influence, rather than to constitutional 
courts. 102  The balance of those reasons may well be different in different legal and 
constitutional cultures, or at different times. Finnis has rightly drawn attention to the 
constitutional context of Australia, where there is no entrenched Bill of Rights, yet a 
healthy rights-respecting culture prevails.103 In Australian labor law, for example, the right 
to freedom of association is implemented through legislation and entrusted to the ordinary 
democratic process. The fact that freedom of association is “constitutionalized” in Canada 
tells us nothing very much about the comparative state of freedom of association in 
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Australia and Canada, beyond the choice of legal technique for implementing the right. 
That would require us to engage with the substance of the right, and its realization in 
practice, rather than the legal form of its implementation. 
Finally, we should never forget that the balance between constraint and 
perfectionism in subsidiarity is not simply an abstract philosophical enquiry. The 
subsidiarity principle inevitably takes its shape in specific political and historical contexts. 
In the middle decades of the twentieth century, when totalitarian regimes of various ugly 
political stripes had effectively dissolved the autonomous associations of civil society into 
the state apparatus, the primacy of constraint was warranted. From the collapse of Weimar 
through to the fall of the iron curtain across Europe, proponents of the subsidiarity 
principle were concerned to set strict limits on the coercive reach of the state in the 
voluntary associations of civil society. In the early decades of the twenty first century, the 
disintegration of mediating associations such as trade unions gives subsidiarity’s 
perfectionist elements a pressing urgency. While our political judgements must always be 
cautious, state indifference rather than state interference now seems to present the biggest 
threat to Anglo-American civil society in the current context. 
 
 
 
